social.noyu.me

the problem is that the C programming language specification has proven to be deeply toxic to the human brain. most humans are immune to it, but once a person has obtained a deep knowledge of software engineering, exposure to and comprehension of the full extent of the specification will almost inevitably drive a person insane. this has been repeatedly demonstrated in classified studies within ISO's BSL-5 infohazard laboratories.

initially, the committee tried to simply delay the release of the specification. this was successful for a number of years, but it was realised, in time, that it was not possible to delay it forever. if outsiders began to suspect that the C standardisation project had stalled, there was a risk that they might independently recreate it and, perhaps unaware of the danger, release it. this could not be allowed to happen.

things finally came to a head when the committee received an anonymous threat: if they did not finalise the specification within a year, their most recent working draft would be publicly adopted, whether they liked it or not.

naturally, this resulted in uncontrolled panic within the inner circle. they could not be sure this was not a bluff. something had to be done.

it was at this point that the real research program began. clearly, the specification could not be fully contained. how, then, to minimise the damage?

after many experiments, an interesting result was found: certain programmers were apparently invulnerable. further analysis revealed that all of these programmers had something in common: they had all previously learned C by reading Kernighan and Ritchie's original C book.

this mystified the committee. why would reading the book protect someone from the specification: wouldn't that familiarity with the language only make them more susceptible to it?

nonetheless, this was their only hope, and they clung to it. more experiments were done.

at long last, they obtained the critical insight: incorrect preconceived notions in the mind of the reader can protect them from correctly interpreting the specification.

with that, there was finally a workable plan. by combining an all-encompassing disinformation campaign with the standard ISO paywall, the committee could ensure that, in the first place, few would think they needed to read the specification; failing that, few would actually get hold of it; and failing that, very few would correctly understand it. with that, the specification could be "safely" released.

the rest, as they say, is history.

@hikari K&R is actually remarkably compatible with undefined behavior as we consider it today

@hikari ...and the "undefined behaviour" is how they kept the darkest parts from being an intolerable infohazard?

@hikari this is so good

@hikari The C in SCP stands for C...

@arclight @hikari

Actually, the original name for the ISO was "International Standards Foundation" (ISF).
"ISF", shifted by 10 characters, yields "SCP".
This was then seen as too obvious, so the name was changed to "International Standards Organization" (ISO).

@hikari

Secure
C
Programming